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In this paper, we show that the values of parameters of a well-
calibrated model are useful in detecting micro behavior. We use a
calibration procedure suitable for validating agent-based models to
show how the evolution of model parameters, obtained via a rolling
window estimation, illustrates the evolution of agents’ strategies in
response to different economic conditions. In this regard, we calibrate
the well-known financial model of Brock and Hommes using three
banking indices (i.e., the S&P SmallCap 600 Financials Index, the
STOXX Europe 600 Banks, and the STOXX Asia/Pacific 600 Banks)
running from 1994 to 2016. The choice of a spatially and temporally
diversified dataset allows us to analyze differences and similarities in
the behavior of banks belonging to the different macro areas, as well
∗The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the
responsibility of the Ministry.
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as to capture agents’ reaction to the several economic phases charac-
terizing the time series investigated.
JEL codes: C52; C63; G15.
Keywords: Microfoundations, validation, agent-based mod-
els, heterogeneous beliefs.
1 Introduction
One of the key points of economic research is to understand how to de-
scribe and synthesize the myriad of disparate individual behaviors. In order
to achieve a coherent behavior, a representative agent framework is usually
adopted in most economic-models (see Stigler and Becker 1977, Blaug 1992
and Kirman 1992, among the first studies). On the one hand, this approach
eliminates the problem of the infinite degree of freedom in the choice of
agents’ decision-making rules. On the other hand, it reduces, via reduction-
ism, aggregate entities to concepts and knowledge for the lower-level domain
of the individual agent, therefore blocking from the outset any understanding
of the interplay between the micro and macro levels. Without entering into
merits and/or limitations of the microfoundations1, what is sure is that this
approach still dominates the way economists model agents’ behavior. Fol-
lowing different lines of research, the economic literature identifies, at least,
two other ways to identify agents’ behavior in market. The first is experi-
mental economics, that is, the application of experimental methods to study
how human subjects behave (see, among many, Hommes et al. 2005; Bao
et al. 2013; Husler et al. 2013 and Agliari et al. 2016). And the second is
agent-based economics, that is, the application of computational techniques
to reproduce micro-/meso- and macro-dynamics via a bottom-up approach
(see, Arthur 1993; Clark 1997; Tesfatsion and Judd 2006; Shoham et al.
2007).
Following this last line of research, this paper is explicitly concerned with
the ability of agent-based models to describe micro behavior. In this regard,
the agent-based literature mainly focuses on input validation, which ensures
that the behavior of individual agents incorporated into the model captures
the salient aspects of human subjects (see Tesfatsion 2013; Tedeschi et al.
2012b). The approach we follow in this paper is, instead, quite different. We
start with a microfounded agent-based model, namely the well-known model
developed by Brock and Hommes 1997 (BH hereinafter), and show how the
1A discussion on advantages and disadvantages of this approach is beyond the scope
of this work. A detailed debate can be found in other studies (see, for instance, Kirman
2010).
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calibrated values of the model parameters can describe real agents’ behav-
ior2.
It is important to recall that in the literature on the agent-based model cali-
bration (see Chen et al. 2012 and Bargigli 2017 for a detailed review), the
estimation of the BH model has a long tradition (see, among many, Boswijk
et al 2007; de Jong et al. 2009, 2010; Manzan and Westerhoff 2007; Reitz
and Sloppek 2009; Kukacka and Barunik 2017). Indeed, even if other types
of financial agent-based models, ranging from ant-type models to Lux mod-
els, have been calibrated using different techniques, including the ordinary
least squares and maximum likelihood methods (see, for instance, Alfarano
et al. 2005; Gilli and Winker 2003; Chen and Lux 2015; Ghonghadze and
Lux 2016; Bargigli et al. 2014, 2018), the strong dominance of models
deriving from the BH adaptive belief system is beyond doubt. This is due to
its simplicity, its analytical tractability and the small number of parameters,
all elements which make this model suitable for the empirical estimation.
Our work is closely related to Recchioni et al. 2015. There, the
authors consider the BH model and estimate the model param-
eters with a non-linear constrained least-squares problem solved
with a local minimization algorithm. Specifically, they identify the
set of model parameters by minimizing a loss function. This func-
tion is the sum of the squared residuals, which are computed as
the difference between the observed and simulated market price
on a given date. The emphasis of that paper is on the method-
ological approach. The authors are interested in analyzing the
accuracy of their calibration procedure in reproducing price dy-
namics under different modeling assumptions. To this end, the
authors show the robustness of their technique both in-sample and
out-of-sample. What we propose here, instead, is conceptually dif-
ferent. Starting from the aforementioned technique, this article
tries to answer an important research question: how can we iden-
tify agent behavior in markets? In fact, the direct observation of
individual behavior remains a very controversial problem of eco-
nomic theory. This work proposes an alternative approach that can
indirectly catch those strategies that are often latent and therefore
not easily detectable. Given the abundance of the available aggre-
gate data, what we suggest is a methodology capable of grasping
micro-behaviors while observing macro-phenomena. In particular,
2It is worth noting that the BH model is not a “pure” agent-based model,
that is, it does not describe the interaction of myriad heterogeneous agents,
but rather synthesizes the heterogeneity through “macro” groups/families of
agents.
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we investigate the possibility of describing the evolution of agent
behavior by using the time series of BH model parameters esti-
mated on aggregate data. In this regard, two simplifications of the
BH model are needed. First, we use the simplest version of the
model, where just two groups of traders compete in the market.
In fact, as shown by Hommes 2001, the introduction of several be-
havioral strategies can generate chaos, strange attractors, and local
bifurcation in the price dynamics, all important patterns which are
not present in the time series considered. Second, in order to un-
derstand the dynamics of the “pure” strategies applied by agents
in the markets investigated, it is important to remove the noise in
the model while understanding the emerging properties in a de-
terministic skeleton. Thus, we assume constant dividends and a
piecewise constant fundamental price. The latter means that we
keep a constant fundamental price in the calibration window while
updating it when the calibration window changes.
We are aware of the limitation of this assumption, especially in
light of recent work which endogenizes the fundamental price in
the BH model (see, for instance, Gori & Ricchiuti 2018; Leng-
nick & Wohltmann 2013; Naimzada & Pireddu 2014; Proaño 2011;
Westerhoff 2012). Nevertheless, we think this simplification is cru-
cial to eliminating any exogenous noise which could interfere with
the interpretation of the estimated parameters3
Given the potentially large implications of banks’ behavior for the real
economy and financial markets, and with the current crisis in mind, we have
decided to apply our approach to identifying banks’ behavior in financial
markets4.
Banks are the main link between financial markets and real economy.
They should provide financing to the private sector and pursue economic
growth. However, in recent decades, they have transferred a massive amount
of resources from the productive to the financial sector. This spectacular
expansion and the growing influence of the financial sector do not seem to
3However, we assess the reliability of the piecewise constant fundamental price by
comparing the results obtained under this assumption with those obtained by the BH
model under a fundamental price based on the Gordon growth models (see, Boswijk et al.
2007, for further details).
4Although the methodology proposed in this paper is applied to banking behavior, we
aim for a wider application of this approach. Specifically, we think that our technique
able to deduce the micro behavior by studying the value of the parameters estimated on
aggregate series can be applied to different markets
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have promoted the economy, which is instead affected by recurrent crises (see
Orhangazi 2008 and Rochon and Rossi 2010). Yet global banking linkages
are viewed as having spread the profound difficulties due to the financial
crisis that began in industrialized countries in 2007 (see, for instance, Fasika
and Pozo, 2008; Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2013; Grilli et al. 2015, 2015b).
Such considerations prompted the International Monetary Fund’s April 2009
World Economic Outlook (WEO) to argue that global bank linkages are
“fueling the fire” of the current crisis (p. 149).
To understand what banks do when confronted with shocks becomes a
key question for evaluating the stability of the economic system. Banks’
strategies are not only a powerful channel of crisis transmission, but also an
instrument of crisis prediction (see Bernanke and Gertler 1990, 1995; Delli
Gatti et al. 2005; Tedeschi et al. 2012 and Chen 2015 ).
In light of the recent banking crises and their tragic repercussions on the
real side of the economy, we focus on analyzing banks’ behaviors, which are
seen as a primary reason for the financial crisis. To this end, we estimate the
BH model on the daily closing values of the S&P SmallCap 600 Financials
Index, the STOXX Europe 600 Banks, and the STOXX Asia/Pacific 600
Banks from 30 December, 1994 to 18 May, 2016. These important banking
indices reflect agents’ strategies from different angles. First they incorpo-
rate information on the behavior of the banks which make up the index.
Specifically, the selected financial instruments are chosen as being represen-
tative of different geographical areas5 (i.e., USA, Europe and Asia) while the
time period considered is relevant due to the presence of different economic
phases. It is worth noting that there is empirical evidence that the
dynamics of these financial instruments, which are seen as a proxy
for common bank soundness and financial stability conditions (see
Bologna and Caccavaio, 2014), is closely related to the motion of
the banks’ total foreign claims in the USA, Europe, and Asia as
published by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) 2018.
This co-movement shows that these financial instruments reflect,
at least partially, the strategies adopted by the banks making up
the indices themselves. Second, these indices also reflect the perception of
the economic actors trading them. In this regard, it is well-known the consid-
erable impact of traders’ expectations on price motions and, the consecutive
feedback on agents’ strategies (see, for instance, De Long et. al 1990 and
Heemeijer et al. 2009). These indices, therefore, allow us to jointly detect
5In Sec. 3.4, we also show some preliminary results regarding the impact of banks
bigger in size on strategies and the resulting effect on financial cycles. To this end, we
estimate the BH model on the daily closing values of the S&P 500 Financial index
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the direct behavior of the financial institutions and the indirect expectation
of investors speculating on banks’ equity. Last but not least, the indices,
being aggregate indicators of markets’ performances, leave the estimated pa-
rameters to describe the micro behavior without this being ex-ante included.
In this regard, our idea is that micro behavior should emerge from the value
of parameters estimated on time series which incorporate different economic
phases. These different economic cycles should, therefore, produce variations
in the estimated parameters’ values and allow us to detect changes in agents’
strategies.
Two steps are essential in achieving our goal. First, we have to prove
that the BH model can successfully reproduce the daily price time series of
the three banking indices investigated. To this end, we show that the
simulated market prices generated by the BH model match the
observed prices even when they are affected by abrupt changes.
Specifically, we show that the relative errors are 0.7% on average.
This first step consists in verifying that our calibration procedure succeeds in
validating the output. This analysis, briefly sketched in this work, is widely
debated in Recchioni et al. 2015.
Second, having successfully proven our calibration for output validation,
we can test its efficiency in describing agents’ behavior. The key idea of our
approach is simple: if the calibrated BH model reproduces the dynamics of
the investigated markets well (i.e., step 1), one can infer that the values of
its estimated parameters may be useful in understanding the evolution of
the behavior of agents operating in those markets (i.e., step 2). This second
step, which is the original contribution of the present paper, requires us to
estimate the model parameters using rolling time windows for each of the
three banking series. In this regard, two exercises are presented: a long-run
analysis where the emphasis is placed on differences and similarities among
the three different geographical areas (i.e., America, Europe, and Asia), and
a short-run analysis where the focus is on the dynamic evolution of banks’
strategies in response to the several economic phases characterizing the time
series investigated. Specifically, in the long (short) run analysis, the model
parameters are calibrated approximately every year (two months) always
using a year of past observations6. After each year (two months), we solve
the calibration problem again, adding the 200 (60) new daily observations
and discarding the 200 (60) oldest ones. In this way, the length of the time
window used in the calibration is kept constant. Hence, we solve 26 (90)
6In our analysis, one year of data corresponds to 200 observations, while two months
correspond to 60 observations.
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calibration problems and the solutions to these problems provide series of
each model parameter.
On the one hand, our long-run analysis shows the presence of strong simi-
larities among the three areas. Indeed, in line with other studies (see Boswijk
et al 2007, Recchioni et al. 2015), all three areas are characterized by the
presence of collective behavior, also known as herding behavior, and the
predominance of trend-follower behavior. The preponderance of the chartist
strategy, with its well-known role in destabilizing prices, appropriately re-
flects the several financial crises characterizing the time series investigated
(i.e., the years ranging from 1994 to 2016). Additionally, our results show
that all countries are distinguished by very high levels in the risk-aversion
parameter, in accordance with the registered financial turbulences.
On the other hand, our short-run findings suggest the key role of banks’
strategic behavior in generating financial distress. In fact, we show that not
only are price bubbles generated by a high percentage of chartist traders,
but financial collapses are also heralded by a sharp increase in the number
of these agents. Last but not least, our results show that when the crisis is
in place, trend followers gradually lose their power and fundamentalists are
able to drive prices to the fundamental value.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the BH model and present the calibration technique. In Section
3, we present numerical experiments on the three banking indices. Finally,
Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2 Model description and calibration technique
In this section, we first briefly describe the Brock and Hommes model (BH
hereinafter) and then we illustrate the technique used for the calibration7.
2.1 The Brock and Hommes model
The BH model, which uses the familiar demand-supply cobweb framework,
considers an adaptive belief system where heterogeneous agents can choose
from among different trading strategies. Two typical investors are distin-
guished: fundamentalists, who believe that the market price is completely
determined by the fundamental value, and chartists, who think that the price
can be predicted using some information about the past. The model then in-
troduces evolutionary competition between the two strategies. At each time
7The term “calibration” used here refers to Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette and
Belitz (1994, pp. 642-643).
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step, agents can revise their strategy according to a fitness measure based
on accumulated past profits. The rewind algorithm is designed so that the
strategy with the highest fitness gains a higher number of followers. Nonethe-
less, the algorithm introduces a certain amount of randomness, and the more
successful strategy has a finite probability of not being followed. In this way,
imperfect information and the bounded rationality of agents is reproduced.
The randomness also helps to unlock the system from the situation where
all agents follow the same strategy. The algorithm generates an endogenous
switching between the two behaviors. This creates alternating periods: times
when the different strategies co-exist and compete for popularity, and times
when one of the two behaviors prevails and dominates the market. This
alternation is the leading mechanism in generating temporary speculative
bubbles.
In what follows, we describe the basic ingredients of the model. For more
technical details we refer the reader to Brock and Hommes 1997 and Hommes
2001.
Agents, which are assumed to be myopic mean-variance maximizers, de-
termine their demand for the risk asset via wealth maximization. The opti-
mal level of risky share, zh,t = Eh,t(p̄t+1 + yt+1 − Rp̄t)/(ασ2), is a function
of the expected market equilibrium price, p̄t+1, the dividend, yt+1, the gross
return of the risk free asset, R = (1 + r) > 1, the risk aversion, α, and the
conditional variance, σ2. By imposing a zero supply of outside shares and
different trader types, h, we use the optimal level of risky share to derive




h=1 nh,tEh,t(p̄t+1 + yt+1), where nh,t
denotes the fraction of agents h at time t. Moreover, in the case of identical






from the market equilibrium price. In order to calculate the equilibrium and
fundamental prices, agents must form their own expectations, Eh,t, on future
prices and dividends. To this end, we assume that all beliefs are of the form
Eh,t(p̄t+1 + yt+1) = Et(p
∗
t+1 + yt+1) + fh(x̄t−1, ..., x̄t−L), where x̄t = p̄t − p∗t is
the deviation of the price from the fundamental price and L is the number
of lags. It is evident that agents believe that market and fundamental prices
may not coincide due to some function fh that depends on the past deviation
from p∗t . We assume the simplest version of the model with only one lag and
two simple linear trading rules. The first one describes fundamentalists, i.e.,
fh,t = 0, who believe that the market price will be equal to the fundamental
price, or, equivalently, that the deviation, x̄t from the fundamental price will
be 0. The second strategy describes chartists, i.e., fh,t = gx̄t−1, where g is
the trend parameter.
For each trading day, agents update their strategy and as a consequence,
the fraction, nh,t, of investor types evolves over time. This dynamics is gov-
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erned by an endogenous fitness given by Uh,t = (p̄t+yt−Rp̄t−1)zh,t+ωUh,t−1,
where ω ∈ [0, 1] is a memory parameter8. Each agent starts with a strat-
egy and computes its profitability with respect to the other one. A ‘Gibbs’
equation, equal to nh,t =
exp(β Uh,t)∑2
h=1 exp(βUh,t)
, then determines the probability that
the trader switches from its own strategy to the other one. This, in turn,
modifies the next equilibrium market price and all the other model dynamics.
2.2 The calibration technique
We illustrate the calibration technique applied to validate the BH model. As
already stressed, we choose the BH model because of its tractability and the
immediate interpretation of the parameters in terms of behavioral attitudes.
The simplicity of the model allows us to easily determine differences and
similarities among the financial markets analyzed during different stages of
the economic cycle.
We introduce the key ingredients of the calibration procedure:
• pot is the daily closing index from the real dataset. The time is t =
0, 1, . . . , τ − 1 with τ > 1. Specifically, t = 0 and t = τ − 1 are, respec-
tively, the first and the last observation dates used in the calibration
procedure.
• ph,t = Eh,t(p̄t+1), t > 0, h = 1, 2, is the agent expectation of the price
at time t, p̄t, t > 0.
• p̄t, t > 0, is the simulated equilibrium market price at time t.
• p∗t is the fundamental price.
• x̄t = p̄t − p∗t , t > 0, is the deviation from the fundamental price.
The calibration technique is composed of the following time steps:
Step i1): compute the expectation of the price for fundamentalists, h = f ,
and chartists, h = c:
ff,t = 0, (1)
fc,t = g x̄t−1. (2)
8In a more complete version of the model, the cost of obtaining a “good” forecasting
strategy is included in the fitness measure.
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Step i2): compute the agents’ fitness measures:
Uf,t−1 = [x̄t−1 −Rx̄t−2]
(−Rx̄t−2)
ασ2
+ ω Uf,t−2, (3)
Uc,t−1 = [x̄t−1 −R x̄t−2]
(gx̄t−3 −R x̄t−2)
ασ2
+ ω Uc,t−2. (4)
Step i3): compute the simulated equilibrium market price and its deviation
from the fundamental price:
x̄t = (nf,t−1ff,t + nc,t−1fc,t)/(1 + r),
p̄t = p
∗
t + x̄t, (5)




, h = f, c. (6)
Step i4) if t ≤ τ go to Step i1 else stop.
We underline that in the time window of the calibration procedure, we
assume the dividend process, yt, to be constant. Constant dividends imply a
constant fundamental price. This assumption makes the proposed calibration
process deterministic since it does not involve any noise in the previous steps.
We now formulate the calibration problems.
Let R4 be the four-dimensional real Euclidean space and Φ ∈ R4 be the
vector containing the model parameters whose values have to be computed




Φ = (α, p∗, β, g) ∈ R4 , α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0
}
. (7)












, Φ ∈M. (9)
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The constrained optimization problem is solved via a metric variable
steepest descent method (see Recchioni and Scoccia 2000). This is an it-
erative procedure that, given an initial point Φ0 ∈ M and making steps in
the direction of minus the gradient of F in a suitable metric, generates a
sequence {Φk}, k = 0, 1, . . ., of feasible vectors (i.e., Φk ∈ M, k = 0, 1, . . .).
The gradient is computed in a suitable metric defined according to the con-
straints defined inM and rescaled in order to ensure the convergence of the
iterative process. The algorithm stops when a maximum number of itera-
tions, Miter, is performed or the Euclidean distance ||Φk+1−Φk|| is less than
a preassigned tolerance.
Figure 1: Re-scaled index values from December 30, 1994 (t = 1) to May
18, 2016. S&P SmallCap 600 Financials Index (blue dashed line), STOXX
Europe 600 Banks (red solid line), and STOXX Asia/Pacific 600 Banks (green
dotted line).
3 The calibration procedure at work
3.1 Description of the data
In this experiment, we calibrate the parameters of the BH model on three
banking sectoral indices representing different geographical macro areas (i.e.,
USA, Europe, and Asia). We use the daily closing values of the S&P Small-
Cap 600 Financials Index, the STOXX Europe 600 Banks, and the STOXX
Asia/Pacific 600 Banks. The data run from December 30, 1994 to May 18,
2016, corresponding to 5579 daily observations.
Figure 1 shows the re-scaled index values used in the calibration exercise.
The re-scaled observed market prices are obtained simply by dividing each
index value by its maximum value over the entire time period considered.
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The analyzed time series consider different phases of boom and burst that
have affected financial markets in the last twenty years. Specifically, the
following episodes can be mentioned: first, the mini crash on October 27
1997, caused by an economic crisis in Asia that then propagated on the US
and EU markets; second, the World Trade center attack on September 11
2001, which caused a sharp drop in global stock markets; third, the internet
bubble bust between July and September 2002, which resulted in a dramatic
decline in stock prices across the United States, Canada, Asia, and Europe;
four, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, resulting in an
abrupt collapse of all series; and, finally, a phase beginning with the outbreak
of the sovereign debt crisis on May 2010.
Figure 1 also shows a strong co-movement in the time series behavior,
which confirms a strong interconnection between financial systems. This has
been especially true since 2003, with a clear anticipation of the US economy
on the European and Asian economies.
Before concluding the analysis of the three indices, it is worth
highlighting the representativeness of this financial instrument in
describing the strategies of the constituent banks. Indeed, there is
empirical evidence of the co-movement of these financial aggregates
with the total foreign claims of American, European, and Asian
banks as published by the BIS (see Bologna and Caccavaio, 2014).
This feature is highlighted by the positive and significant correla-
tion between each index and the respective BIS data9. Specifically,
we find a correlation equal to 0.678, 0.575 and 0.327 for America,
Europe, and Asia, respectively.
In order to calibrate our model, the choice of the starting point, Φ0 must
be made carefully. This problem is handled by calculating the best value
of the objective function (see Eqs. 8–9) on a set of random initial points
belonging to the feasible region M.
Table 1 shows the parameter values corresponding to the smallest values
of the objective functions (i.e., our starting points in the calibration exercise).
By comparing the initial points for the three banking sectoral indices, it is
worth noting that they are quite similar, with the only exception being for
β in the European market and α in the Eastern market. However, the most
striking result is the absolute coincidence in the values of the parameters g
9In this analysis, we use the ultimate risk basis BIS consolidated banking statistics,
which measure banks’ exposures to different countries and sectors. They capture the
worldwide consolidated claims of internationally active banks headquartered in BIS re-
porting countries. We consider international claims by a reporting country towards banks
in counterparty countries. The available data run from 2003 to 2016.
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Table 1: Initial points of the BH calibration procedure.
Parameter US Europe Asia/Pacific
β 0.6 1.5 0.6
g 2.0 2.0 2.0
p∗ 0.45 0.43 0.47
α 19.2 19.2 18.2
ω 1 1 1
and ω.
Firstly, it is important to note that parameter g describes the trend-
follower behavior. A value of g close to 2 has also been found in other studies
involving different market indices (see Boswijk et al. 2007 and Recchioni et
al. 2015). This suggests that the persistence of the trend-following strategy
and its ability to deviate prices from the fundamental price is a constant
feature of financial markets. It is worth noting that when g > 2(1 + r), the
simulated prices diverge from the fundamental price and move to other basins
of attraction. The divergency is mathematically due to the fact that nf,t ≈
nc,t ≈ 1/2 for t > t0 > 0 so that from Eq. 5 we have x̄t = ( g2(1+r))
t−t0 x̄t0 ,
t > t0. This implies that the simulated equilibrium price does not converge
to p∗ as t → +∞ when g > 2(1 + r), while it does converge to p∗ when
g < 2(1 + r). Our estimation procedure probably forces parameter g to
converge to this threshold from below in order to have a longer transient
period before converging to the fundamental price. During this long transient
period, the trajectory is flexible and provides a good fit to the observed data.
Secondly, it is important to note that parameter ω refers to agent mem-
ory. When ω is zero, the model reproduces a situation with no memory, that
is, the fitness equals the realized profit in the previous period. Otherwise,
when ω = 1, the model generates a situation with infinite memory, that is,
the fitness equals the total wealth as given by accumulated realized profits
over the entire past. As clearly shown by the analysis of the starting
points in Tab. 1, we detect the presence of infinite memory in all
markets. Similar empirical evidence proving the presence of high
memory in agent fitness is also present in the analysis of Recchioni
et al. 2015. The presence of high memory also has an important
theoretical consequence. As stressed by Hommes 2001, it is not
clear whether the price dynamics are stable in the case of infinite
memory. Specifically, it still an open question whether, in this cir-
cumstance, fundamentalists are able to stabilize the price towards
its fundamental value and can mitigate the destabilizing impact of
13
the trend-followers (see Brock and Hommes 1997, 1998; Hommes
2001).
3.2 From the estimation of model parameters to the
identification of banks’ strategies
In this section we investigate the ability of the calibrated model parameters
to describe banks’ behavior. In fact, the values of parameters resulting from
calibration of the model on different markets can show differences and simi-
larities in the behavior of agents operating in the markets considered. Two
applications are considered. The first is a long-run analysis among countries
(application (a)). Here the purpose is to describe the relations among the
different geographical areas. In this first exercise we calibrate the parameters
each year, and the final values representing the banks’ strategies are obtained
as an average over the whole time series.
The second application tries to identify how banks’ strategies evolve over
time (application (b)). The idea is to understand how banks react during
different economic phases. In this second exercise, we calibrate the param-
eters each two months10. By generating time series of the optimal value of
the calibrated parameters, this process allows us to investigate how banks
dynamically change their behavior in regard to financial turmoils. The two
exercises are particularly interesting because they allow us to analyze banks’
behavior not only with respect to the geographic areas of interest, but also
with respect to different economic phases.
Before analyzing the ability of the calibrated parameters to describe
banks’ strategies, we must test the ability of the calibration technique to
reproduce the empirical data. To this end, we show that the model is capa-
ble of reproducing the daily price time series of the three different indices.
In this first exercise, we solve problem (8) with τ = 200 and Miter = 1000.
In the calibration procedure, we fix parameters σ = 0.1 and r = 0.01/250
(daily risk free return). The initial point of the fraction nh,0 is 0.5. More-
over, in the calibration procedure, we do not estimate the param-
eter ω, which is fixed and equal to 1 (i.e., the so-called infinite
memory case). This choice is supported by the analysis on the
starting points shown in Tab. 1. In fact, this value corresponds to
10In the two applications (a) and (b), the length of the time window used in the calibra-
tion is constant and equal to 200. The two exercises only differ from the shifts used in the
rolling-windows (i.e., 200 in (a) and 60 in (b)). Hence, we solve 26 calibration problems
in (a) and 90 in (b).
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the smallest values of the objective function for all indices in the
BH model. The initial values of the remaining parameters are fixed as in
Table 1. Table 2 shows the average optimal values of the model parameters
obtained from the calibration procedure. Since the calibration procedure is
deterministic (i.e., it does not include any noise in the simulated equilibrium
market price), the confidence interval of the estimated values of the param-
eters in Tables 2 are obtained by running the calibration procedure on 100
trajectories for each index. These trajectories are obtained by perturbing the
logarithm of each index by adding a noise sampled from a normal distribution
with zero mean and standard deviation given by σn = ξσs, where σs is the
standard deviation of the observed data and ξ is a constant equal to 1%. The
estimated values of the model parameters reported in table 2 are, therefore,
obtained as average over the whole time series and trajectories. Standard
deviations (St.Dev.), mean relative errors (Rel.Err.) and biases confirm that
the parameters are statistically significant. Moreover, in order to assess the
accuracy of our method, for each index r, we calculate the relative errors of
the simulated equilibrium market prices. Specifically, Fig. 2 shows the quan-
tities er,t = |pot − p̄t|/|pot |. We observe that, on average, the relative error is
0.00726. This indicates that the simulated market prices match the observed
prices even when they are affected by abrupt changes.
Figure 2: Relative errors, er,t, between the observed price and simulated equi-
librium market price versus time, obtained using the BH model with the pa-
rameters shown in Table 2. S&P SmallCap 600 Financials Index (blue dashed
line), STOXX Europe 600 Banks (red solid line), and STOXX Asia/Pacific
600 Banks (green dotted line).
Having successfully proven our calibration for descriptive output valida-
tion, we can test its efficiency in describing banks’ strategies. The results
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Table 2: Average model parameter values and average objective function values obtained
with the calibration procedure. The average of each parameter is computed over the one-
hundred estimated values and over all the time windows.
Parameters S&P Financials Index STOXX Europe STOXX Asia/Pacific
β 1.64 1.75 1.56
St. Dev (7.500·10−2) (3.682·10−2) (1.304·10−2)
Rel. Err. (1.457·10−2) (4.478·10−3) (9.778·10−1)
Bias (6.645·10−3) (2.333·10−3) (7.278·10−3)
g 1.95 1.96 2.00
St. Dev (3.759·10−2) (8.496·10−2) (5.556·10−3)
Rel. Err. (3.721·10−3) (1.991·10−3) (2.147·10−3)
Bias (2.670·10−3) (4.483·10−3) (-4.567·10−4)
α 423.21 254.56 344.03
St. Dev (1.413·10+1) (5.54·100) (1.167·10+1)
Rel. Err. (1.875·10−1) (2.719·10−2) (4.986·10−2)
Bias (-6.178·10−2) (2.743·10−3) (-4.676·10−2)
p∗ 459.2403 (0.29) 537.725 (0.28) 104.024 (0.29)
St. Dev (3.266·10−3) (7.913·10−3) (6.957·10−3)
Rel. Err. (4.970·10−3) (1.121·10−2) (1.987·10−3)
Bias (5.327·10−3) (7.028·10−3) (1.216·10−3)
FBH(Φ
∗) 0.00176 0.00220 0.00320
St. Dev (6.956·10−4) (1.878·10−4) (1.492·10−4)
Rel. Err. (4.738·10−2) (6.435·10−2) (1.986·10−2)
Bias (2.432·10−4) (3.784·10−4) (1.061·10−4)
regarding application (a) (i.e., the intra-countries analysis) are already con-
tained in Tab. 2. In fact, the table provides information on differences and
similarities in banks’ behavior operating in the different geographical areas.
Specifically, Table 2 describes banks’ imitative behavior β, trend follower
behavior g, risk aversion α, and (scaled) fundamental values p∗. It is inter-
esting to note that all three areas are characterized by similar values of β and
g. This indicates the presence of collective behavior and the predominance
of trend follower behavior. It is well known in agent-based literature that
mechanisms of behavioral switching and collective behavior, emerging in situ-
ations with information externalities, can lead to large aggregate fluctuations
(see, for instance, Lux and Marchesi 2000; Chiarella et al. 2009; Kirman and
Teyssiere 2002; LeBaron and Yamamoto 2009; Tedeschi et al. 2012). This
result is in line with the many bubble and crash episodes that have occurred
over the last thirty years. Moreover, the high values of risk aversion char-
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acterizing all markets further support the existence of a strong instability in
the investigated time series. It is worth noting that by removing the specula-
tive bubble episodes from the investigated indices, the average risk aversion
sharply decreases and reaches the values of 20.33 (st.dev 1.1413·10−1), 19.35
(st.dev 5.54·10−1), and 17.49 (st.dev 1.167·10−1) for the US, EU, and Asian
indices respectively.
We now investigate the reaction of banks when faced with financial turbu-
lence in the last twenty years (i.e., application (b)). To this end, we solve 90
calibration problems, whose solutions generate bimonthly time series for each
model parameter. All remaining parameters are those used in the previous
calibration experiment.
In order to assess the robustness of the estimation procedure, we evalu-
ate the sensitivity of the estimated parameter values with respect to the shift
used in the rolling-windows. Specifically, we compare the values of applica-
tion (b) with those obtained in application (a) by applying the two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit hypothesis test. The test confirms
that the time series of model parameters, estimated using the two samples,
are drawn from the same population at a significance level of 5%.
Figure 3 shows the time series of the estimated parameters for the three
indices11. A noteworthy feature is the strong volatility in the model parame-
ters emerging during periods of financial instability. The episodes of financial
turmoil are reflected in the dynamics of all parameters, although they are
particularly evident for the Western countries (see first and second columns
of Fig. 3). Specifically, we observe a sharp rise in risk aversion, α, related
to financial stress events. Parameter α strongly increases in all three geo-
graphical areas during the 1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 Lehman
Brothers collapse. By analyzing the risk aversion time series of the American
index (see Fig. 3, first column), we recognize other important moments of
instability, such as the Twin Towers attack in 2001, the downgrading of the
United States’ credit rating by the credit rating agency Standard & Poor’s
in 2011, and the 2013 US debt-ceiling crisis. Similar geographically localized
episodes can be seen in the dynamics of the European and Asian α param-
eters. On the one hand, the European risk aversion strongly resents the
sovereign debt crisis starting in 2010 (see second column of Fig. 3). On the
other hand, the Asian parameter shows the 2002 internet bubble burst, the
2009 fall in GDP and exports, and the two tsunamis in 2004 and 2011 (see
third column of Fig. 3).
11As in Tab. 2, we have computed the average confidence interval of the estimated values
of the parameters shown in Fig. 3 over the whole time series and trajectories. Results are
omitted but similar to those shown in Tab.2.
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Figure 3: Risk aversion (top row), trend follower behavior (second row),
imitative behavior (third row), and fundamental price (bottom row) time
series for the S&P SmallCap 600 Financials Index (first column), the STOXX
Europe 600 Banks (second column), and the STOXX Asia/Pacific 600 Banks
(third column).
Figure 4: Time series of the fraction of fundamentalists, nf , and trend-
followers, nc, for the S&P SmallCap 600 Financials Index (left panel), the
STOXX Europe 600 Banks (central panel), and the STOXX Asia/Pacific 600
Banks (right panel).
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The second row of Fig. 3 displays the time evolution of trend follower
behavior. As for the long-term analysis (see application (a) above), the op-
timum value of parameter g is always around two. In accordance with other
studies (see Boswijk et al 2007, Recchioni et al. 2015), this confirms the
predominance of the chartist strategy and its impact in destabilizing prices.
It is important to mention that chartists are investors believing that price
movements can be predicted by studying past trends. Specifically, they use
historical price time series to forecast future trends. In this respect, a ques-
tion arises: does this strategy make sense during periods of high instability?
Our empirical analysis responds negatively to this question. In fact, we de-
tect a negative correlation between the time series of the risk aversion α at
time t and the trend follower behavior g at time t+ 2. Correlation values are
−0.622, −0.253, and −0.301 for the American, European, and Asian indices,
respectively. This result indicates that after prolonged financial tensions
highlighted by high riskiness, investors do not rely on information coming
from historical data and, therefore, decrease g.
The dynamics of banks’ imitative behavior, β, is shown in the third row of
Fig. 3. This parameter, also known as intensity of choice, answers the ques-
tion of how much agents trust information about other banks’ performance.
By multiplying and then amplifying the fitness measure, Uh, in the Gibbs
equation (6), β is a key parameter in determining the fraction of banks, nh,
that follow the chartist or fundamentalist strategy. A value of β equal to
zero shows complete lack of confidence in other agents’ performance, while
a high value of the parameter reflects a high level of trust in the success of
other banks’ strategies. The evolution of the parameter in the two West-
ern markets (see first and second column) shows the presence of volatility
clustering, a phenomenon reflecting the transition from quiet periods to tur-
bulent ones. Specifically, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008
global financial crisis, we observe erratic behavior in the parameter dynam-
ics. This reflects a well-known phenomenon: during episodes of great
uncertainty, economic agents overreact, making their choices un-
predictable (see Arthur 1994 and Behrens et al. 2007). The evolution of the
parameter in the Asian market instead behaves differently (see third column).
Indeed, it is affected by the time series instability, but its volatility is consid-
erably lower than in the Western markets. Specifically, in this market, the
presence of volatility clustering is not observed12. It would seem that Asian
12In accordance with the empirical literature (see Cont 2001 and Tedeschi et al. 2009),
we check if volatility is persistent by measuring the autocorrelation function of absolute
β for different time lags. We note that while the autocorrelation of the parameter is
insignificant in the Asian market, a positive and slowly decaying autocorrelation of absolute
β is present in the two Western markets. In this case, the autocorrelation function of
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banks are less exposed to financial instability phenomena. This observation
is confirmed by some empirical studies (see Goldstein and Xie 2009) showing
that Asia is protected by its low exposure to US subprime loans and securi-
ties, ample international reserves, current account surpluses, low dependence
on commodity exports, a high share of interregional trade, improved banking
systems, and an ability to implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies.
Finally, the last row of Fig. 3 displays the time evolution of fundamental
prices. As mentioned above, in the calibration exercise, the fundamental price
is treated as a constant unknown model parameter which is estimated over
the investigated time window. As the reader can see, the fundamental price
is also affected by economic turbulence. However, as expected, it remains
constant during quiet periods.
We now investigate the switching phenomenon in agents’ strategies. The
issues are why traders change behavior and the impact of switching on the
price time series. Fig. 4 displays the fraction of traders, nh,t, following
the fundamentalist or chartist strategy. The figure shows time variations
between the two predictors, and this is more evident in the two Western
markets. This result is in line with other empirical studies (see Boswijk et
al. 2007 and Recchioni et al. 2015) showing the ability of the BH model to
create behavioral switching in agents’ strategies.
An important assumption of the BH model is the mechanism of belief
formation, which follows the form Eh,t(p̄t+1 + yt+1) = Et(p
∗
t+1 + yt+1) +
fh(x̄t−1, ..., x̄t−L). This assumption implies that investors are encouraged
to follow the fundamentalist strategy when they observe market prices close
to the fundamental price. In order to verify the reasons driving investors to
choose this strategy, we analyze the correlation between the fraction of fun-
damentalists and the distance between the market price and the fundamental
price. Specifically, is it correct to think that a price realignment toward its
fundamental level induces agents to become fundamentalists? The correla-
tions between nf,t and the differences between observed and fundamental
price, (pot − p∗t ), are −0.3343, −0.4632, and −0.2017 for the US, EU, and
Asian indices, respectively. The significant negative values of the correla-
tions confirm the above assumption. It is important to emphasize that these
values do not derive from a simple modeling assumption. In fact, they are
derived using real market prices, pot , and not the simulated market prices, p̄t.
On the one hand, this result shows that the fundamentalist strategy emerges
when the price is close to the fundamental price. On the other hand, the
result further highlights the ability of the calibration technique to reproduce
absolute parameters is well fitted by a power law with exponent equal to 2.7 and 3.1 for
the US and EU time series respectively.
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real prices.
Finally, we investigate the impact of agent beliefs on the price time series.
The theoretical and empirical literature have shown the destabilizing effect
of the chartist strategy on price dynamics (see, Boswijk et al. 2007; Chiarella
et al. 2009; Recchioni et al. 2015 ). In line with this view, we show that price
bubbles are generated by a high percentage of chartist traders. Table 3 shows
the correlations between the index time series (see Fig. 1) and the lagged time
series of nc,t (see Fig. 4). As can be seen, correlations increase at one-two
Correlation Lag τ ′ = 0 Lag τ ′ = 1 Lag τ ′ = 2 Lag τ ′ = 3 Lag τ ′ = 4
US f ,t - nc,t−τ ′ 0.2148 0.2155 0.2509 0.2292 0.0028
EU f ,t - nc,t−τ ′ 0.3683 0.3925 0.3069 0.1009 0.0498
Asia f ,t - nc,t−τ ′ 0.2177 0.2769 0.0475 0.0357 0.0157
Table 3: Correlations between the index time series and the fraction of
chartists, nc,t−τ ′ , with τ
′= 0; 1; 2; 3; 4 at a 1% confidence level.
lags (i.e., two-four months) before the abrupt change in the indices, and they
decrease at zero lag. This result confirms that large aggregate fluctuations
emerge as chartists take power. Moreover, given that the time series of nc,t
is lagged, the fraction of chartists can be considered an “indicator” capable
of anticipating the financial instability.
3.3 Robustness analysis of the piecewise constant fun-
damental price
The aim of this subsection is to empirically test the robustness
of some of our modeling assumptions. Specifically, we investigate
whether the assumption of a constant fundamental price over the
calibration window is a robust and reliable hypothesis in that the
corresponding model captures the price dynamics and the fractions
of agents’ strategies. To this end, we carry out two experiments.
First, based on a constant fundamental price, we study the ability
of our calibration technique to validate the output. Second, we
compare the performance of a fundamental price given by a con-
stant value to those given by a static Gordon model. In contrast to
the analysis illustrated by Recchioni et al. 2015, where the authors
evaluate the calibration performance based essentially on in-sample
good fitting and out-of-sample calibration errors, here the reliabil-
ity of the time series is tested in terms of the model’s ability to
capture some price features other than the price point-wise value.
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In fact, as stressed by a recent string of literature (see Lamperti
et. al. 2018 and the reference therein), the quantitative validation
of agent-based models, even using a machine learning approach,
should be carried out on the model’s ability to reproduce some
statistical features of the price dynamics. To this end, we focus on
mimicking the observed realized volatility and the observed deviations from
the fundamental price, since these two quantities play a crucial role in
the investor’s decision-making process. In fact, on the one hand,
the realized volatility of a stock/index is a nonparametric ex-post
estimate of the return variation, which has been proved to be re-
lated to market sentiment (see, for example, Balcilar et al. 2018,
Smale 2012). The most common realized volatility measure is the
sum of the squared return realizations over a fixed time interval,
typically using one to six months of daily returns (see Andersen
and Benzoni 2008 for further details). This measure is also used in
financial markets for hedging purposes. On the other hand, devia-
tions from the fundamental price are often used to define sell/buy
signals such as those generated by the Bank of America and Merrill
Lynch Global Breath rule (BofAML Global Breath for short). This
rule is based on the deviation of large- and mid-cap stocks in 47
different countries from their 50-day and 200-day moving averages,
which behave like piecewise constant fundamental prices 13.
Before going into the details of the analysis implemented here,
it is important to highlight that all the following experiments refer
to application (b). Specifically, we estimate the model parame-
ters every 60 days by using consecutive daily data contained in
a 200-day window. This window of 200 days is moved along the
data time series, discarding the sixty oldest data and inserting the
sixty newest data. Roughly speaking, 60 days correspond to three
months since a month consists of about 21 trading days, so we are
dealing with series of quarterly data.
We now start by validating the output and, in particular, study-
ing the reliability of the agent fraction obtained with the constant
fundamental value in detecting financial instability. To this end,
13Specifically, the BofAML Global Breath rule generates a buy signal when a net 88%
of markets in the MSCI All Country World index are trading below their 200-day moving
average and 50-day moving average. This rule is based on the fact that the MSCI ACWI
captures large- and mid-cap representation across 23 developed markets and 24 emerging
markets. (see https://olui2.fs.ml.com/publish/content/application/pdf/gwmol/Theme-
Watch-Put-People-First.pdf for further details)
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following Alfarano et al. 200514, we show that the ratio of chartist
to fundamentalist is able to describe the dynamics of the realized
volatility. Thus, we test for a linear relationship between the real-
ized volatility, Rvolt, of the index at time t and the ratio n̂c,t/n̂f,t,
where n̂h,t is the time series of the 60-day average of agent frac-
tion. Specifically, we investigate whether the following specific lin-

















and εt is the error (i.e., a Gaussian variable with zero mean and
constant variance). A linear regression with zero intercept to test
model (10) is carried out for each index.
Table 4 shows that model (10) captures the realized volatility
dynamics for any analyzed market index, and, more interestingly,
the estimated parameter σ∗ of Euro and U.S. indices is the same,
while it differs from the parameter σ∗ of the Asia index. More
specifically, σ∗ is the value of the realized volatility when the two
contrasting forces in the market are equal. Thus, when the two
forces are identical, we observe a larger volatility in the eastern
market (annual volatility 24.44%) than in the western markets (an-
nual volatilities 23.02%).
The second step of the output validation consists in proving the
reliability of the estimated fundamental price, p∗t . We now provide
empirical evidence that the assumption of piecewise constant fun-
damental price is reliable. To this end, we recall that by virtue of
Eqs. (1)–(5), the simulated deviation from the fundamental price
(i.e., xt = pt − p∗t ) satisfies the following equation:
(1 + r)xt = nc,tg xt−1, (12)
14Alfarano et al. 2005 show that the spot volatility is proportional to the ratio of
the number of chartists to the number of fundamentalists when the equilibrium price is
obtained by setting the sum of the excess demands of chartists and fundamentalists equal
to zero.
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ASIA index EURO index USA index
adj-R2 0.729842 adj-R2 0.726725 adj-R2 0.670481
R2 0.741746 R2 0.738629 R2 0.682386
no. observ. 86 no. observ. 86 no. observ. 86
std err. 0.133015 std err. 0.135038 std err. 0.153845
Sign.F 2.77e− 26 Sign.F 4.58e− 26 Sign.F 1.59e− 22
σ∗ 0.2448 (***) σ∗ 0.2301 (***) σ∗ 0.2301 (***)
conf. interval [0.2135, 0.2762] conf. interval [0.2004, 0.2598] conf. interval [0.1961, 0.2642]
Table 4: Linear model (10) with piecewise constant fundamental price: variance analysis
ASIA index EURO index USA index
adj-R2 0.959724 adj-R2 0.959720 adj-R2 0.962694
R2 0.971489 R2 0.971485 R2 0.974458
no. observ. 86 no. observ. 86 no. observ. 86
std err. 0.119621 std err. 0.103866 std err. 0.1027436
Sign.F 7.00e− 67 Sign.F 7.05e− 67 Sign.F 6.88e− 69
c 1.9529 (***) c 1.9748 (***) c 1.9936 (***)
conf. interval [1.8808, 2.0251] conf. interval [1.9019, 2.0478] conf. interval [1.9241, 2.0632]








We then test the model
xot = c n̂c,t x
o
t−1 + ηt, (14)
where ηt is the error (Gaussian variable with zero mean and con-
stant variance) and xot is the 60-day average observed deviations









− p∗t . (15)
We note that the higher the reliability of the model, the smaller
the difference of c−g/(1 + r). This is not trivial since Eq. (12)
holds for the simulated deviation from the fundamental price, xt.
This is obtained from the calibration procedure and it matches the
observed deviation only via the objective function, while xot in Eq.
(14) is an observed average deviation from the fundamental price.
Table 5 shows that the estimates of parameter c are 1.9529
(Asian index), 1.9748 (Euro index), and 1.9936 (USA index). Bear-
ing in mind that the riskfree interest rate is chosen to be r =
24
no-scaled indices scaled indices
ASIA index EURO index ASIA index EURO index
min 5.34 28.12 0.21 0.30
max 24.79 92.17 1.00 1.00
mean 16.14 57.64 0.65 0.62
median 17.63 58.67 0.71 0.63
St.dev 4.49 13.98 0.18 0.15
Skewness -0.73 -0.24 -0.73 -0.24
Kurtosis -0.64 -0.63 -0.64 -0.63
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the price-to-dividend ratio.
0.01/252 and that g = c(1 + r), we obtain g ≈ c. In fact, the esti-
mated values of c are consistent with the mean values of g shown
in Table 2 and with the median values of g, namely 2.0006 (ASIA
index), 1.9999 (Euro index), and 1.9998 (USA index).
We conclude this subsection by comparing the performance of
the BH model in the output validation in the case of a constant
and non-constant fundamental price. Specifically, we repeat the
two exercises implemented above (see models (10) and (14)) by
calibrating the BH model using the price-to-dividend ratio. This
implies that the fundamental price is given by the static Gordon
model (see Boswijk et al. 2007 for further details). Thus, the
deviation from the fundamental price in Eq. (5) is now equal to
x̂t = δt − m, where δt is the price-to-dividend ratio and m is the
fundamental price-to-dividend ratio as prescribed by the Gordon
model (see Boswijk et. al. 2007 and Recchioni et al. 2015).
The empirical analysis proposed here regards the daily price-to-
dividend ratio of Asian and European indices from March 31, 2011
to December 30, 2013 (i.e., 1502 observations for each index). Some
descriptive statistics of the indices and their corresponding scaled
versions are given in Table 6. The model parameters are estimated
both in the case of constant and non-constant fundamental price by
using a rolling window of 200 consecutive trading days with 60-day
shifts. Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the results of these experiments.
Specifically, Table 7 shows the results concerning the linear model
(10), while Table 8 presents those concerning the model (14) with
GFP and CFP, referring to the Gordon and constant fundamental
prices, respectively. Moreover, the Jarque Bera p-value refers to
the p-value of the Jarque Bera test for the normality of the residual
while Sign.F refers to the F -test of the regression.
As the reader can see by observing the values of adj − R2 and
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ASIA index (GFP) EURO index (GFP)
adj-R2 0.639505 adj-R2 0.879233
R2 0.689505 R2 0.931865
no. observ. 21 no. observ. 21
std. err. 0.207934 std. err. 0.138893
Sign.F 2.26e− 6 Sign.F 2.30e− 10
Jarque Bera p-value 1.447e-14 Jarque Bera p-value 0.5185
σ∗ 0.3102 (***) σ∗ 0.3684 (***)
conf. interval [0.2131, 0.4074] conf. interval [0.3048, 0.4320]
ASIA index (CFP) EURO index (CFP)
adj-R2 0.841565 adj-R2 0.82633
R2 0.891565 R2 0.87633
no. observ. 21 no. observ. 21
std. err. 0.061348 std. err. 0.094559
Sign.F 8.38e− 11 Sign.F 2.96e− 10
Jarque Bera p-value 0.2759 Jarque Bera p-value 0.1270
σ∗ 0.17 (***) σ∗ 0.2478 (***)
conf. interval [0.1442, 0.2003] conf. interval [0.2039, 0.2906]
Table 7: Linear model (10) with the Gordon fundamental price (GFP-upper table) and
constant fundamental price (CFP-lower table): analysis of variance with Jarque Bera
normality test for residuals.
R2, the BH model with CFP always slightly outperforms the BH
model with GCP, with the only exception being the linear model
(10) in the case of the European index. However, both BH models
— with CFP and GFP — provide very similar results in terms
of the σ∗ and c estimates, indicating that these constants reflect
features of the price dynamics.
3.4 How banks’ size influences strategies and financial
cycles
In this section, we illustrate some preliminary results regarding the impact of
banks’ size on strategies and the resulting effect on financial cycles. Specifi-
cally, we show how the estimated values of the model parameters are affected
by a sample made up of banks bigger in size. To this end we calibrate the
BH model, as in the application b) above, to S&P 500 Financial index. As
the S&P SmallCap 600 Financial Index, S&P 500 Financial index is made
up of U.S banks whose size is, however, significantly higher (see Tab.9 for a
summary description of the two indices’ components).
The left panel of Fig.5 shows the re-scaled index values used in this cali-
bration exercise. As the reader can notice the S&P 500 and the S&P 600
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ASIA index (GFP) EURO index (GFP)
adj-R2 0.898211 adj-R2 0.927935
R2 0.950843 R2 0.980566
no. observ. 20 no. observ. 20
std err. 0.199438 std err. 0.194943
Sign.F 2.00e− 13 Sign.F 3.84e− 12
Jarque Bera p-value 0.2790 Jarque Bera p-value 0.8382
c 2.0399 (***) c 1.9667 (***)
conf. interval [1.8172, 2.2627] conf. interval [1.7114, 2.2221]
ASIA index (CFP) EURO index (CFP)
adj-R2 0.934134 adj-R2 0.93315
R2 0.986766 R2 0.985781
no. observ. 20 no. observ. 20
std err. 0.111915 std err. 0.12336
Sign.F 1.44e− 18 Sign.F 2.47e− 18
Jarque Bera p-value 0.6910 Jarque Bera p-value 0.6673
c 2.012968 (***) c 1.992881(***)
conf. interval [1.9010, 2.1249] conf. interval [1.8779, 2.1078]
Table 8: Linear model (14) with the Gordon fundamental price (GFP upper table) and
constant fundamental price (CFP lower table): analysis of variance with Jarque Bera
normality test for residuals.
Table 9: Summary description of the S&P SmallCap 600 and S&P 500 Financial indices.
S&P 600 S&P 500
Num. of Constituents 85 66
Max Market Cap 3,246.48 417,813.26
Min Market Cap 346.50 4,744.27
Mean Market Cap 1,479.13 49,140.39
Median Market Cap 1,291.47 23,910.87
(see blue dashed line in Fig.1) strongly co-move and display similar phases
of boom and burst. However, the statistical analysis shows some important
differences between the two indices. Specifically, the average value of the re-
scaled S&P 500 is higher than that of the S&P 600 (i.e., 0.587 v.s 0.520) but
with a lower variance15 (i.e., 0.18 v.s 0.22). As the empirical literature well
documents, price volatility is a good proxy of financial and macroeconomic
uncertainty (see Baum et al. 2008; Ghosal and Loungani, 2000; Berardi and
Tedeschi 2017). The fact that big financial institutions are more trustable
15Other important summary statistics for the S&P 500 Financial index (S&P SmallCap
600 Financial Index) are: minimum 0.23 (0.19), maximum 0.97 (0.93), skewness 0.03 (0.55)
and ex. kurtosis -0.76 (-0.76).
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Figure 5: Re-scaled S&P 500 Financial index from December 30, 1994 (t = 1)
to May 18, 2016 (left side). Objective function values obtained with the
calibration procedure (right side).
in the eyes of investors and, consequently, their price less volatile, is a well-
documented fact. On the one hand, indeed, the number of large banks failing
is quite small, as evidenced by the fact that over 465 U.S banks failed from
2008 to 2012, only 60 were big, that is with assets higher than $1.0 billion
(see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2013). On the other hand, the
belief that the biggest financial institutions are so vital to the economy that
it would be disastrous if they went bankrupt makes stockholders less uncer-
tain in investing in this type of institutions. This second point is closely
related to the idea of ”bailout”, and the several studies on ”too big, too
complex, too interconnected, or too many to fail” (see Brown & Dinc 2011;
Cheng &Van Cayseele 2010; Dam & Koetter 2012; Duchin & Sosyura 2014;
Farhi & Tirole 2012; Marinc & Rant 2014). It is worth noting that the lower
index volatility associated to big financial institutions must not be confused
with their lower systemic risk. The systemic impact of the large financial
institutions is undoubtedly much higher but their probability of bankruptcy
is certainly much lower (see Caccioli et al. 2012; Iori et al., 2006; Lenzu and
Tedeschi, 2012; Tedeschi et al., 2012a). The analysis of the systemic risk,
seen as the direct and indirect spillover effects arising from the bankruptcy,
or the financial distress of a shocked organism, is outside the scope of our
study and incompatible with the BH framework.
Before analyzing the effect that banks’ size has on strategies, the right panel
of fig.5 shows the accuracy of our calibration technique in reproducing the
index dynamics. Specifically, the low average value of the objective function,
equal to 0.0042 (st.dev 2.252·10−4), indicates the ability of the estimation
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procedure to accurately interpret the dataset16.
We are now ready to assess the repercussions that banks bigger in size have
on the estimated model parameters. To this end, we just focus on the es-
timated parameters reproducing different dynamics than those of the S&P
600 index17. Top panel of Fig. 6 reproduces the estimated values of the two
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Figure 6: Risk aversion (top left), imitative behavior (top right), correlation
between the index time series and the lagged time series of nc,t over the time
(bottom left) and its average value over the time and simulation (bottom
right). Results refer to the S&P 500 Financial index.
model parameters that statistically deviate from those of the S&P 600 index:
namely the risk aversion, α (left side), and the intensity of choice, β (right
side). With regard to the risk aversion, it is worthy of note that the average
value of α is lower for the the S&P 500 than for the S&P 600 (i.e. 302.4 with
st.dev 1.112·10+1 vs 423.2 with st.dev 1.413·10+1). Moreover, by comparing the
16In order to assess the robustness of the estimation procedure on the S&P 500 index,
also in this analysis, we have computed the average confidence interval of the estimated
values of all parameters over the whole time series and 100 trajectories
17Results of the other estimated parameters’ time series are omitted because similar to
those shown in the left column of Fig.3.
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time series of the estimated risk aversion parameter for the S&P 500 and
the S&P 600 (see Fig.3, top row on the left), we can notice that the time
series of the first index is less sensitive to the crises affecting the economy.
Specifically, big banks seem to be less affected by the several financial tur-
moils perturbing the investigated series. An important exception is at the
Lehman Brothers collapse. This episode has a much stronger adverse impact
on the risk aversion of big financial institutions than of small ones. This is
demonstrated by the higher value that the α parameter assumes for the S&P
500 than for the S&P 600 (i.e. 4800 v.s 1100). Curiously, this event affects
big banks with a noticeable time lag. In fact, we notice that the parameter
rises to τ = 60 (i.e, April 30, 2009) for the S&P 500 index while to τ = 58
(i.e., November 13, 2008) for the S&P 600. A possible insight into this time
lag is attributable to the reliability of large banks. To undermine their cred-
ibility, it has been necessary no just the single episode ”Lehman Brother”,
but the systemic amplification generated by the episode itself, and of course,
this amplification has taken time.
With regard to the intensity of choice, the top right panel of Fig. 6 shows
the dynamics of this parameter. Specifically, big banks during crisis periods
show the tendency to strengthen their intensity of choice. While small banks,
during financial shocks, show strong uncertainties in choosing their strategy,
as shown by strong oscillations in β, big banks show a more coherent and
stable behavior, as highlighted by the clear ascending or descending trend
of β which gradually strengthens over time. This means that big financial
institutions are more confident in choosing and maintaining their strategies.
This is also confirmed by the lower switching affecting big banks compared
to small ones. Specifically, the average switching between fundamentalists
and chartists takes the values of 0.19 (st.dev. 0.02) and 0.36 (st.dev. 0.05),
for the S&P 500 and 600, respectively18.
Last but not least the bottom panel of Fig. 6 shows the lagged correlation
between the S&P 500 index in t and the fraction of chartists in t − 1 over
the time (left side) and its average value over time and trajectories (right
side). As the figure shows strong periods of instability are anticipated by
a significant rise in the fraction of chartists. Once again, trend-followers
destabilize the system by creating considerable bubbles. However, before the
bubble achieves its maximum, chartists lose their power, as confirmed by the
sharp decline in the correlation value, and fundamentalists take the lead by
exploding the bubble and re-lowering the index value. The trend followers’
18The average switching between fundamentalists and chartists is defined as the av-
erage number of times, over calibration time-windows and simulations, the fraction of
fundamentalists is less of 0.5.
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anticipatory effect in destabilizing prices is clearly shown in the bottom right
panel of Fig. 6, where the correlation wave between the chartists’ fraction
and the index first increases from t− 4 up to t− 1, and then decreases from
t.
4 Conclusions
In this work, we have analyzed the ability of a well calibrated agent-based
model to describe agents’ strategic behavior through the value of the esti-
mated parameters. By calibrating the BH model on daily data of three bank
indices (i.e., US, EU, and Asian indices – S&P 500 SmallCap 600, STOXX
Europe 600 Banks and STOXX Asia/Pacic 600 Banks) running from 1994
to 2016, we have answered some questions regarding both similarities and
differences in the behavior of banks operating in different geographical areas
and the evolution of banks’ strategies during several economic phases.
We have detected many similarities among the investigated areas. Specif-
ically, all three markets are characterized by the presence of collective behav-
ior and the predominance of trend follower behavior. Moreover, high values
of risk aversion characterizing all markets further support the existence of a
strong instability in the time series investigated. Additionally, our analysis,
has also highlighted an important difference among markets. In fact, Western
countries have appeared strongly perturbed by the financial instability affect-
ing the periods considered. The parameters of these countries have shown
volatility clustering indicating long transition periods between frenzied and
calm times. Specifically, the erratic behavior of the intensity of choice pa-
rameter has supported this phenomenon and highlighted the incapacity of
traders to cope with uncertainty.
With regard to the evolutionary analysis, our technique has shown some
important features in banks’ behavior. First, we have observed a decline in
the power of the chartist strategy during crises. This indicates that pro-
longed financial tensions induce banks not to rely on information on past
prices. Moreover, our results have shown the emergence of switching be-
haviors during pre/post periods of financial instability. On the one hand,
we have noted that fundamentalists work as a thermostat of the society by
realigning prices to the fundamental price. On the other hand, our analysis
has clearly revealed the destabilizing power of chartists. These traders, in
fact, not only generate asset bubbles, but also herald their arrival. In this
respect, our study has shown that large aggregate fluctuations in the indices’
time series are preceded by an increase in the number of trend-followers.
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